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Secondary market values tend to reflect past difficulties rather
than anticipate future  ones. They can't be used to build a case for
debt relief on the grounds that it would cause secondary dis-
counts to fall and hence the value of outstanding debt to rise.
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Using panel-data econometric techniques to  exploit efficiently and quickly all available
examine the case for external debt relief,  information on creditworthiness.
Hajivassiliou explores the relations between
measures of creditworthiness and debt discounts  Hajivassiliou also uses the model estimates
on the secondary market,  to analyze other issues, including whether large
surpluses by the oil-exporting natio, s signifi-
Do the discounts on the secondary market  cantly affected international lending markets
reflect a history of past repayment problems - after the first major oil shock; the question of
or do they anticipate future debt crises?  Differ-  liquidity vs. solvency; the degree to which
ent answers to this question imply different  discrepancies between official and black market
things about the desirability of debt relief.  exchange rates can predict future financing
problems (little evidence was found to support
If the secondary mar-ket  discount is a good  the proposition that overvaluation is a precursor
predictor of future debt problems - and not  of debt crisis); and the degree to which factors
merely a reflector of past problems - then debt  exogenous to a country (such as imports by
relief, in averting anticipated problems, will  industrialized countries, inflation in OECD
reduce the secondary market discounts and  nations, and world interest rates) contribute to a
increase the value of debt held by intemational  country's debt crisis.
lenders.
World economic factors were generally
Hajivassiliou found, however, that secon-  found to be statistically insignificant as predic-
dary market values tend to reflect past difficul-  tors of repayment problems in developing
ties, not anticipate future ones - so they can't  countries - except that inflation in the industri-
be used to build a case for debt relief.  The  alized countries in some versions of the models
secondary markets - still in an early evolution-  is found to marginally reduce the likelihood of
ary stage - are quite "thin" and thus unable to  future debt problems in developing countries.
This paper, prepared for the conference "Dealing with the Debt Crisis," is a product
of the Debt and International Finance Division, Intemational Economics Department
Copics are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC
20433.  Please contact Sheilah King-Watson, room S8-029. extension 33730 (40
pages with charts and tables).
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suggestions.1.  Introduction
The  recent  literature  ^n  external  debt  repayments  problems  of  LDC's  places
primary  emphasis  on  the  issue  of  "debt  overhang"  (see  in6ep-*k  Krugman  (1987),
Sachs  (1986)).  This  term  refers  to  outstanding  external  debt  amassed  in  the  past
that  exceeds  a country's  expected  ability  to  repay  it.  These  authors  build
theoretical  models  that  highlight  the  importance  of  debt  overhang  and  derive
policy  implications  about  the  desirability  of  forgiving  or  refinancing  such  debt.
Figures  1  to  3  illustrate  that  the  external  financing  problems  of  the  developing
nations  have  indeed  been  worsening  steadily  since  the  first  major  oil  shock  of  1973
and  have also been affected adversely oy  the  second  major  cil  shock  in  1978.  Moreover,  the
figures  suggest  that  we  may  now  be  experiencing  a  substantial  world  debt  crisis,
since  the  problems  have  been  accelerating.
Figure  1  contrasts  the  rapidly  mounting  outstanding  external  debt  of  the
countries  under  investigation  with  the  only  mildly  rising  quantity  of  debt
actually  serviced.  The  gap  between  obligations  and  repayments  is  widening
alarmingly.  Figure  2 makes  the same  point  by showing  the fraction  of
debt-servicing  obligations  that  are  in  arrears  in  each  year.  Figure  3  presents  a
similarly  bleak  picture,  by showing  that  the  proportion  of countries  under
analysis  that  are  experiencing  a  repayments  problem  of  some  type  (for  example,
obligations  in  arrears,  or  a  need  to  request  IMF  assistance  or  a  rescheduling  of  repayments)
exhibits  the  same  deteriorating  pattern.
There remains,  however, a clear  need for  an empirical  investigation  of  the
mounting external financing problems of the LDC's and of the theoretical propositions of
the debt overhang literature regarding such problems, in order to shed some  light  on the
relative  merits  of  the  various  arguments and  policy implications concerning the
desirability of debt forgiveness  or refinancing.  This paper attempts  to  meet such a need
by  employing panel-data  econometric  techniques.  One  specific issue it  examines is
whether a  case  4or  external  debt  relief  can  be made by exploring  the  relations
betweer. measures  ef  creditworthiness  and  the  debt  discounts  on  the  secondary-2-
market.  It  investigates  empirically  whether  the  discounts  on  the  secondary  market
reflect  a  history  of  past  repayments  problems  or  whether  they  anticipate  future
debt  crises.  The  answer  to  this  question  has  implications  about  the  desirability
of  debt  relief.  For  example,  a  situation  of  debt  overhang  is  commonly  referred  to
as  being  "on  the  wrong  side  of  the  Laffer  curve."  This  implies  that  forgiving  part
of  the  outstanding  debt  will  eventually  lead  to  a  higher  value  of  debt  being  repaid
by  a  country.  The  precise  way  this  may  happen  is  typically  left  unspecified.  One
possible  mechanism  that  may  make partial  forgiveness  appealing  to the
international  lenders  is  the  followiiig.  If  the  secondary  market  discount  is  a  good
predictor  of  future  debt  problems  and  not  merely  a  reflector  of  such  problems  of
the  past,  then  debt  relief,  in  possibly  averting  anticipated  problems,  may  reduce
the  secondary  market  discounts  and  thus  increase  the  value  of  the  debt  held  by  the
international  lenders.  1/
The  fact  that  the  secondary  markets  have  been  in  operation  for  less  than
three  years  constrains  severely  the  type  of  econometric  analysis  that  is  feasible
in  attempting  empirically  to investigate  these  questions. 2/  The  approach  we
develop  here  is  to  employ  the  econometric  creditworthiness  methodology  in  Feder
and Just (1977),  McFadden  et al. (1985),  and Hajivassiliou  (1987).  The
constructed  indicators  of  creditworthiness  are  then  used  to  investigate  whether
the secondary  market  discounts  anticipate  or follow  economic  performance
measures.
Section  2  presents  descriptive  econometric  models  of  creditworthiness  that
serve  as the  basic  framework  for  the  empirical  analysis  of  the  paper,  and  it
summarizes  the key empirical  results  of  these  models.  Several  issues  in
I The  issue  of  whether  a  case  for  debt  relief  can  be  made  through  the  secondary
market  discounts  is  also  investigated  by  Cohen  (+98  )4'A  -WA 
2 It  is  not  possible,  for  example,  LO use  direct  "reduced  form"  econometric  models
and try to explain  statistically  the  discounts  as a function  of economic
performance  variables.-3 -
international  finance  are  investigated,  such  as  the  question  of  "liquidity  vs.
solvency,"  the  degree  to  which  discrepancies  between  official  and  black  market
exchange  rates  can  predict  future  financing  problems,  and  the  importance  of  world
factors  exogenous  to  a  country  in  causing  debt  crises.  Ve  also  investigate  whether
large  surpluses  run  by the  oil-exporting  nations  significantly  affect  the
international  credit  markets.  These  models  are  then  tested  for  structural  breaks
following  major  external  events,  like  the  1973  oil  shock  and  institutional  changes
in  meeting  the  debt  crisis  in  the  early  1980's.  In  the  same  section,  we  construct
indices  of  exchange  rate  over-valuation,  based  on  discrepancies  between  black
market  and  official  exchange  rates,  and  examine  whether  overvaluation  acts  as  one
of  the  precursors  of  debt  crises.  Econometric  methodological  issues  are  discussed
in  Appendix  1.
Section  3  discusses  the  estimation  results  and  some  of  their  implications
for  policy.  Ye  show  that,  as  expected  a  p7iori,  reliable  econometric  inferences  on
these  issues  requires  explicit  accounting  for  unobservable  persistent  heterogeneity
among  nations  as  well  as  for  the  impact  on  bankers'  perceptions  of  a  history  of  bad
debt  performance.  Section  4 attempts  to evaluate  the  significance  of  world
economic  factors,  exogenous  to  developing  countries,  in  precipitating  crises.
Examples  of  such  factors  include  measures  of  imports  by  industrialized  countries,
inflation  in  the  OECD  nations,  and  world  interest  rates.  The  findings  are
important  for  policy-related  questions  that  address  the  "adjustment  efforts"  by
LDC's  and  the  distinction  between  economic  mismanagement  and  adverse  world
developments  that  are  beyond  the  control  of  country  administrators.  Section  5
examines the  econometric stability  of  the  models after  the  major oil  shocks of the
1970's and  after  1981,  the  last  year  of  observation  of  most  past  studies  of
creditworthiness  in the  literature.
Section  6  discusses  the  iss  zs  related  to  debt  overhang  and  describes  some
of  the  characteristics  of  the  recently  developed  secondary  market  for  outstanding-4-
LDC  debt.  I  attempt  to  answer  the  question  of  whether  the  discounts  observed  on
this  market  are  routinely  reflecting  past  debt  problema  or  anticipating  future
crises.  The  implications  of  our  findings  are  explored.
Section  7  offers  some  concluding  remarks.  Data  sources,  construction  of
variables,  and  descriptive  statistics  are  presented  in  Appendix  2.
2.  Econometric  Nodels  of  Creditworthiness
Reduced-form  descriptive  econometric  models  were  estimated  in  Feder  and
Just  (1977)  to  quantify  the  determinants  of  LDC's  external  financing  problems.  In
particular,  binary  logit  models  (KcFadden  (1973))  were  employed  to  explain  the
dichotomous  variable  Yit
Yit  = 1  if  a  debt  problem  occurs  in  country  i  in  yea-  t
= 0  otherwise,
as  a  (linear)  stochastic  function  of  k  exogenous  explanatory  variables  xit,  with
the  index  i...,I  denoting  country  and  t=.,...  ,Ti  year  of  observation.  McFadden
et  al.  (1985)  and  Rajivassiliou  (1987)  present  more  structural  credit-rationing
models  that  incorporate  refined  measures  of  the  degree  of  severity  of  debt  crises.
Moreover,  these  studies  address  important  methodological  issues  arising  from  the
ract  that  differing  country  characteristics,  such  as colonial  histories  and
political,  financial,  and  religious  institutions,  imply  the  presence  of  unobserved
persistent  country  heterogeneity.  Appendix  1  discusses  these  issues  from  an
econometric  perspective  and  presents  econometric  methodologies  appropriate  to
address  them  (see  also  Rajivassiliou  and  McFadden  (1988)).
Let  us  begin  with  an  empirical  motivation  for  the  econometric  models  to  be
presented.  Information  on  three  primary  indicators  of  debt  repayments  problems
was  compiled:  (1)  confidential  data  on  external  debt  obligations  in  arrears;  (2)
the  occurrence  of  a rescheduling  agreement  between  the  debtor  nation  and  the
international  bankers;  and  (3)  programs  of  IMF  involvement,  such  as  stand-by-5-
agreements  of  a  high  tranche  level.  Table  1  presents  the  empirical  evidence  on
transitions  between  these  types  of  difficulties.  Each  transition  from  the  state
in  the  previous  year  to  the  one  in  the  current  year  is  given  in  three  different
ways. The  actual  number  of  country-years  vitfl  such  a transition  is  presented
first; then  in  parentheses  the  column  percentage  appears,  the  percentage  of
transitions  into  a  given  current  problem;  lastly,  in  square  brackets  we  give  the
row  percentage,  the  percentage  of  all  types  of  ensuing  states  that  emanate  from  a
specific  type  of  problem  in  the  previous  year.
As  can  be  seen  from  the  table,  arrears  can  be  viewed  as  the  mildest  form  of
problem  and  seem  to  act  as  a  reliable  predictor  of  more  severe  crises.  For  example,
we  see  that  of  the  952  country-years  without  a  repayments  problem  in  one  period,
Aearly  5%  had  their  obligations  go  into  arrears  in  the  following  period,  as  opposed
to  a  combined total  of  7%  that  approached  the  bankers  or  the  IMF  for  assistance.
Moreover,  more  than  90%  of  countries  with  significant  arrears  in  their  obligations
either  maintain  this  situation  the  following  year  or  experience  a  more  severe
multitude  of  repayments  problems  (a  combination  of  arrears,  IMF  or  reschedulings).
In  contrast,  only  70%  (60%)  of  countries  currently  having  only  an  IMF  agreement
(rescheduling)  in  effect  either  maintain  their  status  or  have  more  than  one  type  of
repayments  problems  in  the  following  year.  These  latter  two  types  of  problems  thus
seem  to  indicate  a  rather  more  severe  type  of  debt  crisis,  as  they  are  typically
accompanied  by  more  than  one  other  type  of  repayments  difficulty.  Another  way  of
highlighting  these  stylized  facts  is to note  that  of the 51 country-years
exhibiting  a  severe  crisis  with  all  three  types  of  difficulty  present,  20%  had  only
significant  arrears  in the previous  period,  14% had significant  arrears
accompanied  by  an  IMF  agreement  in  effect,  and  45%  had  a severe  crisis  in  the
previous  period  as  well. In  only  9 cases  was  a severe  crisis  preceded  by  a
rescheduling  or  IMF  involvement  wvthout  any  arrears  present.  These  features  of
repayments  difficulties  will  guide  our  econometric  modelling  below.-6-
To explain  the  basic  models  we will  use  in this  paper  to quantify
creditworthiness,  denote  by  yi the  latent  (unobserved)  propensity  of  country  i  to
have  a  debt  problem  in  period  t.  We  model  this  as  a  linear,  stochastic  function  of
observable  country  characteristics,  past  history,  world  conditions,  and  other
relevant  factors,  measured  by  a  vector  xit:
(2.1)  Yt = X  +
In  the  credit  rationing  models  of  Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981),  WcFadden  et  al.
(1985),  and  Iajivassiliou  (1987),  Yt is  directly  related  to  the  gap  between
notional  demand  for  and  supply  of  new  funds  to  the  economy.  Vhen  the  debt-crisis
propensity  exceeds  some  threshold,  normalized  to  0,  we  observe  the  realization  of
an external  financing  problem, whicb  I  indicate  by
(2.2)  Yit  =1  iffYt  >
= 0  otherwise.
This  is  the  threshold  crossing  model.
Denoting  the  cumulative  distribution  function  of  the  error  term it  bv
F(.),  we  can  calculate  the  probability  of  a  financing  crisis  as
(2.3)  P(Yit=l)  = F (X!tp)-
Under  the  specific  distributional  assumption  of  normality  for  the  error  term  fit'
we  have  what  is  known  as  the  probit binary  response  model.  Expression  (2.3)  will
serve  as  a  simple  indicator  of  lack  of  creditworthiness  of  country  i  in  period  t.  In
the  sequel,  we will  define  our  binary  variable  indicating  the  presence  of
repayments  problem,  yit,  by  a  combination  of  one  or  more  of  the  following  types  of-7-
difficulties:  "significant"  arrears  in  the  debt  repayments  obligations,  an  IMF
stand-by  agreement  of a high  tranche  level  or an extended-fund-facility
agreement,  or  procedures  to  implement  an  agreement  of  a  rescheduling  of  debt
obligation  initiated  by  a  country  ani  its  international  creditors.  3/
An  alternative  measure  of  creditworthiness  that  relies  on  a 3-regime
rationing  model  developed  in  XcFadden  et  al.  (1985)  and  in  Hajivassiliou  (1987)  is
defined  as  follows:  Two  distinct  thresholds,  0 and 1 , on  the  range  of  the  debt
crisis  propensity,  ytt,  determine  -he  regime  for  economy  i  in  year  t. Define  an
indicator  variable  yit  by:
(2.4)  Yit  =0  if  Yt <  0
=1  if  %,  <  yt <  t
=2  if  ° <  Y;
This  model,  known  as  a  model  of  ordered  resDonse,  will  be  estimated  by  imposing
necessary  assumptions  about  the  distribution  of the  error  term. Assuming
normality  as  above,  we  will  have  the  ordered probit model.  This  model  is  used  to
capture  some  of  the  features  identified  in  the  transition  matrix  of  Table  1,  by
defining  yit=O  to  indicate  a "no crisis"  situation,  yit=l  to  stand  for  a  "mild"
crisis,  and yit= 2 to  represent  a  "severe  crisis".  For  example,  recognizing  the
importance of  significant  arrears  as a precursor  of  more  severe  repayment  crises,
we define  a "mild crisis"  as the  presence  of only significant  arrears  in a county's
obligations,  and  characterize  a severe  crisis  as  one  with  IMF  involvement  or
rescheduling.  4/
3 See  the  data  appendix  for  precise  definitions  of  these  variables.
4 Another  generalization  we  also  investigated  was  a four-regime  model,  where  the
severity  of  a  repayment  crisis  is.  described  by  the  number  of  different  types  of
external  financing  difficulty  a country  experiences.  The results  are
qualitatively  similar  to  the  ones  of  the  3-regime  models  and  are  not  reported
separately.-8 -
A third  measure  of  creditworthiness  based  on  even  moxe  information  can  also
be  obtained  by  using  censored  regression  models.  Again  suppose  that  (2.1)  measures
the  propensity  of  a  country  to  experience  a  debt-repayments  problem  with  Yt
measuring  the  excess  demand  gap  for  external  funds.  Suppose  further  that  a
strictly  positive  excess  demand  gap  will  manifest  itself  in  the  country's  letting
repayments  obligations  go  into  arrears,  whereas  no  arrears  will  be  observed  for  a
country  that  is  experiencing  no  repayments  problem. 5/ In  this  vein,  if  yit  denotes
observed  arrears,  we  have  the  censored  regression  model
(2.5)  Yt  =ytt  if  y%.  >  0
= 0  otherwise.
Since  in  this  model  the  full  extent  of  the  crisis  is  observed  in  the  form  of  the
level  of  arrears  when  these  are  strictly  pcsitive,  more  information  is  utilized
here  than  in  the  threshold  crossing  model  (2.2).  As  a  result,  the  creditworthiness
indicator  based  on  (2.5)  will  be  more  accurate  than  the  analogous  indicator  based
on  (2.3).  Ve  will  impose  normality  assumptions  on  the  censored  regression  model,
and  hence  we  will  be  estimating  a  Tobit  model.
Versions  of  all  three  types  of  models  are  estimated  for  a  panel  set  of  data  of
109  developing  countries  observed  through  the  years  1970-1986.  The  preferred
specifications  are  then  used  to  construct  creditworthiness  indicators.  The  final
step  is  to  investigate  whether  such  creditworthiness  ir  'icators  exhibit  any  links
to  secondary  market  discounts  as  discussed  in  Section  6  below.  f/
5 Some  qualifications  to  this  modelling  are  set  out  in  Haj  ivassiliou  (1987).
6 Note  that  the  more  structural  credit-rationing  econometric  model  developed  in
Hajivassiliou  (1987)  will  not  be  employed  in  this  paper,  because  our  main
objective  will  be to  examine  anv  predictive  links  between  creditworthiness
indicators  and  secondary  market  discounts,  for  which  the  "reduced  form"  approach
taken  here  will  suffice.  Identifying  the  specific  parameters  of  demand  and  supply
functions  is  not  of  primary  interest  in  this  study.-9 -
In  the  econometric  implementation  of  these  models,  it  is  important  to  allow
explicitly  for  unobservable,  persisteAt  heterogevetty  among  nations,  as  Nell  as
for  the  impact  on  bankers'  percept.ons  of  a  history  of  bad  debt  performance.  This
is  done  by  using the  so-called  "random-effects"  panel-data  methodology.  See
Appendix  1 for  details.  As we  will  see  below,  our  expectation  that  such
heterogeneity  is  important  is  strongly  confirmed  by  our  findings.
3.  EmDirical  Results
The  main  results  of  the  basic  creditworthiness  analysis  appear  in  Tables  2
and  3  and  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  In  all  versions  of  the  3  models  estimated,
binary  probit,  3-regime  ordered  probit,  and  tobit,  the  signs  of  the  coefficients
of  the  ecplanatory  variables  exhibit  considerable  stabilty  and  are  mostly  as
expected,  when  the  estimated  coefficients  are  statistically  significant.  7/
Our  results  are  uniformly  strong  with  respect  to the importance  of
information  on  past  repayments  problems.  All  types  of  variables  that  signal  past
problems  (presence  of  significant  arrears  in  interest,  presence  of  significant
arrears  in principa],  presence  of either  rescheduling  agreement  or IMF
involvement  8/)  are  positive  and  significant  in  each  of  the  models  in  predicting
future  repayments  problems.  This  importance  of history  of past  bad  debt
performance,  though  somewhat  weakened,  is  still  preserved  by  the  introduction  of
persistent  unobserved  heterogeneity  among  countries.
Our  prior  expectations  of  the  importance  of  both  unobservable  persistent
7Some  versions  of  the  3-regime  ordered  probit  model  were  also  attempted,  with  the
"mild  crisis"  case  defined  by  the  sole  presence  of  an  IMF  involvement.  The  results
of  these  trials  were  uniformly  less  strong  compared  to  the  specifications  we
report  here  in  which  arrears  characterize  the  middle  regime.
8 One  may  find  the  positive  effect  of  past  IMF  involvement  to  be  rather  surprising
since  one  would  expect  the  financial  discipline  imposed  on  a  country  through  a
conditionality-related  IMF  arrangement  to  be  considered  valuable  by  international
lenders.  The  puzzle  may  be  resulved,  howev-r,  once  one  recognizes  that  our
reduced-form  specifications  cannot  separately  identify  banker  from  country
behaviour.-10-
heterogeneity  among  nations,  and  the  impact  on  bankers'  perceptions  of  a  history
of  bad  debt  performance,  are  strongly  confirmed.  This  can  be  seen  throughout
Tables  2  and  3. These  tables  show  that  allowing  for  heterogeneity  does  not
elininate  the  effect  of  history,  though  it  predictably  reduces  history's  significance
somewhat.  This  also  corroborates  previous  findings  by  NcFadden  et  al.  (1985),
Rajivassiliou  (1987),  and  Rajivassiliou  and  McFadden  (1988).  One  other  interesting
related  finding  is that  once we condition on informatior  about repayments problems
in  the  immediately preceding  period,  the  cumulated number of  past problems is  not
statistically  very  important.
The  coefficient  of  the  ratio  of  reserves  to  imports  is  generally  small,
negative  as  expected,  and  statistically  significant.  The  coefficient  on  the
debt-to-exports  ratio  is  small  but  has  the  expected  positive  sign.  The  ratio  of
interest  service  due  to  exports  has  a  significant  and  positive  effect  on  the
propensity  to  encounter  debt  repayments  problems,  while  the  ratio  of  principal
service  due  to  exports,  even  though  generally  less  significant,  has  a  negative
sign.  This  evidence  mildly  favours  the  "solvency"  hypothesis.  Since  the  ratio  of
total  ou  standing  debt  relative  to  exports  appears  strongly  significant,  the
liquidity  hypothesis  would  predict  positive  coefficients  for  both  interest  and
principal  due,  because  of  the  implied  deleterious  effect  of  shortening  average
maturities.  That  we  typically  find  a  negative effect  of  principal  due  lends  weak
support  to  the  "solvency"  view  by  rejecting  the  liquidity  view.  It  is  interesting
to  note  that  attempting  to  pool  interest  and  principal  repayments  due  into  a  single
debt-service-due  variable  is  statistically  very  strongly  rejected;  debt  service
due  appears  to  be  insignificant.
The  estimated  models  in  Table  2  can  shed  some  light  on  another  important
policy  issue:  Is  an  overvalued  exchange  rateg/  one  of  the  fundamental  causes  of
3 possibly  leading  to  a  capital  flight  in  anticipation  of  an  imminent  devaluation- 11  -
external  financing  problems,  or  is  overvaluation  a  very  costly  distortion  that
arises  fiom very  high  levels  of  external  indebtedness?  One  way  to  investigate  this
issue  is  to  construct  a  measure  of  over  aluation  and  test  whether  it  exhibits  any
predictive  power  in  our  models  of  (lack  of)  creditworthiness.  Our  over-valuation
measure  is  based  on  a  discrepancy  between  official  and  black  market  exchange
rates.  Simple  econometric  causality  tests  are  carried  out  to  test  statistically
whether  overvaluation  precedes  or  follows  external  debt  problems.  Such  tests  are
not  conclusive  and  hence  are  not  able  reliably  to  distinguish  between  the  competing
claims. Vith  these  caveats,  note  that  we were  never  able  to obtain  any
statistically  significant  predictive  power  of the overvaluation  index  in
anticipating  future  crises  nor  did  we  find  any  effect  in  the  reverse  direction.
The  level  of  the  overvaluation  index  neither  Granger-causes  debt  crises,  nor  is  it
caused  by  them.  Since  these  findings  may  be  a  direct  result  of  inadequacies  in  the
constructed  overvaluation  measure,  the  issue  is  still  open.
4.  Adjustment  Efforts  vs.  Exogenous  Causes  of  Debt  Crises
Another issue  I analyze  using  the estimated models is  the importance of world
economic factors,  which are  exogenous to  a  developing  country,  in  explaining  the
occurrence  of  external  debt  repayments  problems.  Such  factors  include  the  volume
of  import  demand  by  industrialized  countries,  inflation  in  the  OECD  nations,  and
world  interest  rates.  The  findings  have  important  policy  implications  on  LDC
"adjustment  efforts"  to  stave  off  external  financing  crises.  It  is  important  to
distinguish  between  economic  mismanagement  and  unwillingness  to implement
policies  that  would  ease  the  external  financing  requirements  and  adverse  world
developments  that  are  beyond  the  control  of  country  administrators  and  for  which
it  is  deemed  unfair  to  penalize  the  country.
After  controlling  for  a  cour  ry's  flow  of  exports  and  the  aipount  of  interest
repayments,  we  find  that  "t*-world  factors  do  not  have  any  significant  additional- 12  -
explanatory  power.  To  be  more  specific,  neither  the  3-month  nor  the  6-month  LIBOR
is  statistically  significant  in  the  estimations.  The  Fame  holds  true  in  general  for
the oil-exporting  countries'  current  account  surplus  and their level  of
international  reserves,  as well as for the current  account  surplus  of
industrialized  countries. The only  notable  exception  is inflation  in the
industrialized  countries,  which in some estimated  versions  of the models
marginally  reduces  the likelihood  of future  problems. This  finding,  albeit
statistically  weak,  may  be  explained  if  /x$a inflation  is  associated  with  a
loosened  monetary  policy  by  the  authorities  in  the  industrialized  countries,  which
leads  to  an  easing  of  the  credit  conditions  in  inte-national  markets.  Similarly,
one  might  expect  a  higher  LIBOR  to  increase  financing  problems  for  LDC's  even  after
controlling  for  the  implied  higher  interest  repayments  obligations,  if  higher
LIBOR  signifies  restricted  world  liquidity.  The  presence  of  such  an  effect  was  not
confirmed  by  our  estimations.
5.  Stability  of Creditworthiness  Models over-Time
Table  4  presents  the  results  of  investigating  whether  structural  breaks
occurred  in  the  processes  determining  repayment  problems  over  time.  One  popular
view  attributes  part  of  the  blame  for  the  LDC  repayments  problems  to  the  glut  of
"petrodollars"  after  the  first  1973  major  oil-shock.  We  find  only  weak  evidence
that  such  a  structural  break  occurred  in  the  estimated  relationships.  Similar  tests
were carried out  to examine the importance  of the second major oil shock of the late  1970's
in causing  structural  instability  of the  econometric  models.  The  evidence strongly  rejects
this hypothesis.
Another  possibility  we investigate  is  that  a  structural  break  occurred  after
the  much  greater  institutional  involvement  that  followed  the  onset  of  defaults
beginning  in  1982.  Ye  find  that  t: probabilities  of  repayments  problems  seem  to
have  worsened  after  1981.  See  the  significantly  positive  POST1981  dummy  variable- 13  -
in  Table  4 and  the  marginally  significant  likelihood  ratio,  which  suggests  a
structural  break  after  1981. This  year  also  coincides  with  the  last  period  of
observation  of most  previous  studies  of creditworthiness.  Hence,  it  may be
misleading  to  attempt  to  extrapolate  the  findings  of  such  studies  to  cover  recent
developments  without  incorporating  recent  data  in  the  estimations.
6.  The  Secondary  larket  for  LDC  Debt
Several  authors  have recently  explored  the theoretical  and policy
implications  of  debt  overhang,  a  situation  in  which  external  debt  amassed  in  the
past  exceeds  the  normal  abilities  of  a  country  to  repay.IO/  Krugman  (1987)  builds
models  showing  that  it  may  be  in  the  interest  of  international  lenders  to  keep
refinancing  such  loans
balc  xnderly 4ng  4 F  ivrne.  The  creditor's  hope  is  that  the  debtor's  fortunes  may
unexpectedly  turn  dramatically  for  the  better,  in  which  case  the  loans  will  be
repaid.  This  is  a  formalization  of  Keynes'  famous  dictum  that  "if  you  owe  your
banker  one  hundred  pounds  you  are  at  his  mercy;  if  you  owe  him  a  million,  he is  at
your mercy.  "
A conflicting  consideration,  however,  is  that  the  interest  rate  on  the
refinanced  loans  should  not  rise  to  discouragingly  high  levels.  Amassed  external
debt  that  exceeds  by  far  the  ability  of  a country  to  repay  has  been  blamed  by
several  authors  for  introducing  possibly  severe  distortions  in  the  operation  of  a
country's  domestic  economy. For  example,  according  to  Sachs  (1986),  a very
serious  consequence  of  debt  overhang  is  that  it  discourages  domestic  investment.
Public  investment  declines  because  of  the  bad  state  of  governmental  finances,  and
private  investment  is  then  caught  in  a vicious  circle  with  dwindling  public
investment  causing  a deterioration  oI  infrastructure  necessary  for private
10  See  primarily  Krugman  (1987)  and  Sacns  (19b6).- 14 -
enterprise.  For  these  reasons  a  debt  overhang  situation  is  commonly  referred  to
as  a  country  lying  on  the  "wrong side  of  the  Laffer  curve."  Partial  debt  relief  may
be  a  sensible  option  for  creditors  in  such  a  case,  because  the  total  value  of  the
debt  they  will  eventually  recover  may  be  higher  than  in  the  absence  of  relief.
To  investigate  this  issue,  we  can  employ  the  econometric  framework  developed
in  the  preceding  sections  and  relate  it  to information  on  discounts  at  which
external  debt  trades  on  the  secondary  markets.  Part  of  our  maintained  hypothesis
will  be  that  the  econometric  indicators  of  creditworthiness  we have  constructed
reflect  the  relevant  actual  repayments  profiles  of  countries  and therefore  can be
used  to  predict  future  repayments  problems.  If  the  secondary  markets  are  backward
looking  and  only  reflect  past  performance,  then  their  economic  efficiency  is
rejected.  Today's  conditions  would  then  not  feed  into  secondary  market  discounts
right  away,  even  though  such  events  clearly  may  have  implications  about  future
creditworthiness.  In  such  a  case,  an  incentive  would  exist  for  a  debt  facility  to  buy
back  debt  and  forgive  part  of  it,  because  the  operator  of  the  facility  might  believe
that  investment  will  respond  izvourably  to  forgiveness  and  alleviate  the  overhang.
Alternatively,  if  the  secondary  market  discounts  can  successfully  anticipate  future
repayments  problems,  the  bankers  might  find  partial  debt  relief  to  be an attractive
option.  Then partial  relief  may reduce  the  likelihood  of  a future  debt  crisis  and
hence  possibly  raise  the  value  of  the  debt  held  by  the  bankers,  if  it  leads  to
sufficiently  lower  discounts.
To complete  the  argument,  suppose  now that  we change  our maintained
hypothesis  and  take  for  granted  that  the  markets  are  efficient;  they  are  able  to
incorporate  quickly  new  information.  Given  this  maintained  hypothesis,  i.e.,  that
they  price  the  assets  to  reflect  rapidly  the  relevant  economic  information,  one
should  expect  the  secondary  market  discount  also  to  be  able  to  anticipate  future
repayment  performance. Then  irrelating  creditworthiness  indicators  and
discounts  would  be  implicitly  testing  whether  the  indicators  we  constructed  are  good-15-
proxies,  and just how  well they do in anticipating  future  debt-servicing  capacity.
The structural  stability  and high predictive  ability  of our models, reported  in the
previous  sections,  give  some  hope that  the  power in  being able  to  separate  the  two
hypotheses  is  relatively  high.  Therefore  finding  that  the  secondary  market
discounts  are  only  weakly correlated  with  measures of  the  probability  of  future
repayments  crises  would suggest  significant  inefficiencies  in  these  markets  in
absorbing  information.  This  might then  suggest,  of  course,  that  countries  would
have an incentive  to  buy back their  own  debt because they  can realize  that  debt  is
undervalued  and  that  the  markets  do  not  appropriately  value  their  true
creditworthiness.
A problem  we  want  to  acknowledge  directly  is  that  our  reduced  form
indicators  may reflect  an  incipient  liquidity  problem  or  a  more  fundamental
long-term  insolvency  problem. It/  Since the  secondary market is  pricing  an asset,  it
ideally  will  reflect  the  anticipated  lifetime  stream of income of the  asset  and not
necessarily  short-term  adverse  income effects.  Given the  large  information  set
used in constructing  the  indicators,  however, I am confident  that  they are  able  to
reflect  long-term  problems as well.
The recent  burgeoning  of  unilateral  debt  actions  by  major  LDC  borrowers
helps  to explain  much of the  significant  discounts  at  which LDC  debt  is  valued  on
the  secondary  markets. 1 2/  Some descriptive  statistics  on  secondary  market
discounting  of the  outstanding  debt  of  35 nations  appear  in  Figure  4 for 1986 and
1987.  The range  is  quite  dramatic,  with the debt of  "bad risks"  like  Nicaragua and
Sudan commanding  less  than  5 cents  for  each dollar,  while the  debt  of  financially
11  Recall that our findings  were not able to resolve this issue unambiguously.
12 Although the  secondary market price  of  LDC  debt  held  by international  banks is
not  a perfect  guide  to  more generpl  market  sentiments  concerning  LDC  debt,  Sachs
(1987) finds that  stock  market prices  of  the  commercial banks closely  reflect  the
secondary market valuation  of their  LDC  exposure.  As a result,  a careful  analysis
of the  secondary market valuations  seems important.-16  -
more  sound  economies  like  Turkey  suffers  only  a  small  discount.  Note  that  in  some
cases  the  discounts  vary  quite  substantially  over  the  two  years  of  observation.
The discounted  price for Nigerian debt, for example, fals  from 55% in 1986 to  29% in  1987,
while in  the  case of Colombia  the  discounted  price  rises from  64%  to  84% over the  same
period.
What  relation,  if any, exists  between  the discounts  observed  for
outstanding  LDC  debt  on  the secondary  market,  and  the  measures  of country
creditworthiness  and  propensity  to  encounter  a  debt  problem  constructed  using  our
econometric  estimates?  Table  6 presents  the  main  evidence on  the  central  question  of
whether  the  discounts  reflect  a  history  of  past  repayments  problems  or  instead
primarily  anticipate  future  debt  crises.  Our  findings  support  the  conclusion  that
the  secondary  market  discounts  are  correlated  in  the  expected  directionts/  with  the
econometric  measures  of  creditworthiness  we construct  as  well  as  with  direct
indicators  of  past  repayments  problems.  But  these  correlations  are  not  very
strong.  Their  weakness  is  confirmed  by  the  low  explanatory  power  of  the  estimated
regressions  in  the  last  part  of  Table  6,  which  try  to  explain  the  discounts  by  past,
future,  and  current  creditworthiness  indicators.  Moreo-er,  these  regressions  suggest  that
the  secondary  market  evaluations  anticipate  only  rather  imperfectly  future  external
financing  difficulties.  14/
Hence, the  evidence casts  doubt  on  a  case  for  debt  relief  that  is built  on  the
argument  that  such  relief  would cause  secondary  market  discounts  to  fall  and  hence
possibly  the  value  of  outstanding  debt  to  rise. Our  findings  suggest  that  the
secondary  markets,  being  still  in  an  early  stage  of  development,  may  be  relatively
"thin"  and  hence  not  able  to  exploit  efficiently  and  rapidly  all  the  available
creditworthiness  information.  The large  information  set  used  in estimating  the
13 There  is,  however,  one  statistically  insignificant  exception.
14  Indicators  of  current  and  anticipated  creditworthiness  correlate  less  strongly  with
secondary  market  discounted  prices,  than  do  such  indicators  of  current  and  past
creditworthiness.-17-
econometric models in this paper makes it unlikely that  this finding can be explained by
the  inability of the constructed indicators of creditworthiness to  capture both  upcoming
short-term  liquidity  as well as longer term solvency problems.  Nor can this finding
be  explained  by  predictive  inadequacies  of  the  estimated  models  on  which  the
creditworthiness indicators were based, since as can be seen from Tables  4 and 5, only
mild  structural  breaks  occur  in  the  models and  moreover the  models exhibit  a
relatively  high  ability  of  predicting  future  repayments problems.  Instead,  this
result  seems due to  the  fact  that  the  secondary markets are  dominated by exogenous
institutional  factors.  An  interesting  question  that  remains is  whether  these
markets will  eventually  become  more efficient.  15/
7.  Conclusion
In  this  paper,  I  employed panel-data  econometric  techniques  to  draw  some
inferences about  a  possible  case  for  external  debt  relief  by  exploring  whether
secondary  market  discounts  for  external  debt  efficiently  reflect  important
economic performance information  and underlying  creditworthiness.  I investigated
empirically  whether  the  discounts  on the  secondary  market  reflect  a  history  of
past  repayments  problems  or  whether  they  anticipate  future  debt  crises.  The
answer to  this  question  carries with it  implications  for the  desirability  of  debt
relief.  If  the  secondary  market  discount  is  a  good predictor  of  future  debt
problems and not  merely  a  reflector  of  such past  problems,  then  debt  relief,  by
poss.bly  averting  anticipated  problems,  may  reduce the  secondary market discounts
and therefore  increase  the  value  of  the  debt  held  by the  international  lenders.
The main finding  here that  the  secondary  markets  do not  seem to  absorb  rapidly
15 Another interesting question that  arises here is an elasticity  issue:  in  assessing
the desirability  of debt relief  international  bankers clearly  care  about the  value
of  the  debt  and  not  just  its  price.  See Cohen (1989)  for  an  analysis  of  this
question.  By concentrating  on price  only,  I have attempted  to  focus on the  question
of the efficiency  of the  secondary markets.- 18  -
economic  information,  suggests  that  they  are  still  in  an  early  evolutionary  stage
and  not  yet  very  efficient.
Descriptive  econometric  models  of  creditworthiness  served  as  the  basic
framework for the  empirical  analysis  of the  paper.  Our results strongly confirm prior
expectations of  the  importance  of  both  unobservable persistent  heterogeneity  among
nations, and the impact on bankers' perceptions of a history of bad debt performance.  Ve
discussed  issues  related  to  debt  overhang  and  formulated  in  an  empirically
testable  way  several  propositions  from  the  theoretical  literature  pertaining  to
policy  questions.  The  estimated  models  were  also  used  to  analyze  several  other
issues  in  the  international  finance  literature.  For  example,  indices  of  exchange
rate  over-valuation  were  construct-d,  based  on  discrepancies  between  black  market
and  official  exchange  rates,  and  were  used  to  examine  whether  overvaluation  is  a
precursor  of  debt  crises.  Little  evidence  was  found  for  this  proposition,  nor  did
we  find  evidence  for  causality  in  the  reverse  direction.
Next,  the  possibility  of  structural  breaks  in  the  processes  determining
repayments problems over  time  was also  explored,  after  the  major oil shocks of the
1970's and after 1981, when a much greater institutional  involvement in the international
financial markets took place.  No strong  evidence  for  structural  breaks after the  two
major oil shocks was detected.  It  does appear,  however, that  analyses  using  only
information  prior  to  1981  cannot  be  safely  extrapolated  to  the  1980's.  The
considerably  greater  amount  of  information  available  to  us  in  this  study,  covering
6  more  years  of  observation,  seems  to  offer  significant  statistical  efficiency
gains  in  estimation,  which  result  in  more  robust  models.
Finally,  attempts  were  made  to  evaluate  the  significance  of  world  economic
factors,  exogenous  to  developing  countries,  in  precipitating  crises.  Examples  of
such  factors  include  measures  of  imports  by  industrialized  countries,  inflation  in
the  OECD  nations,  the  OPEC balar  e3  of  payments,  and  world  interest  rates.  The
findings  are  important  for  policy-related  questiops  that  address  the  "adjustment-23 -
that  retain  their  consistency  even  when  the  distributional  assumption  of  normality
is  violated.  The  findings  are  quite  similar  to the  ones  obtained  under  the
parametric  distributional  assumption  of  normality,  and  are  thus  not  reported  in
detail.  Moreover,  the  distribution  free  maximum  score  binary-response  estimator
only  achieved  a  predictive  accuracy  of  73%  ,  compared  to  about  857.  for  the  normal
binary  probit  model.  Sirce  ability  to  predict  ensuing  external  financing  problems
is at the heart  of our argument,  our preferred  specifications  impose  the
parametric  normality  assumptions.- 24  -
Appendix  2:
Data  Sources,  Construction  of  Variables,  and  DescriDtive  Statistics
Abbreviations  for  Data  Sources  (Computer  Tapes)
BOP  Vorld  Bank,  Vorld  Tables,  economic  data  sheet  2,  balance  of  payments  (1987)
ERP  U.S.  Council  of  Economic  Advisers,  1985  Economic  Report  of  the  President
Ill  IMF  Annual  Reports  of  the  Director,  various  issues.
IFS  International  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics  (1987)
VB  World  Bank,  World  Tables,  economic  data  sheet  1  (1987)
VDT  World  Bank,  Vorld  Debt  Tables  (1987)
VCY  World  Currency  Yearbook,  various  issues.
All  series  consist  of  1853  country-year  observations,  on  109  countries  over  the
1970-1986  period. All  conversions  between  dollar  and  local  currency  values
employed  the  period  average  exchange  rate  from  IFS.
Indicators  of  ReRayments  Problems
PSA
Presence of  "Significant"  Arrears in  Interest, 1970-1986,  VB.
"Significant"  defined  as  greater  than  .001  of  Total  External  Debt.
PSI"
Presence  of  "Significant"  Arrears in  Principal,  1970-1986,  VB.
"Significant"  defined  as  greater  than  .01  of  Total  External  Debt.
PRSSIIF
Occurrence  of  a  Rescheduling  Arrangement  and/or  IMP  involvement,  1970-1986,
IMF.  IMF  involvement  defined  as  IMF  support.  IMF  support  is  defined  by  an
IMF  standby  agreement  of  second  or  higher  tranche  or  use  of  the  IMF  Extended
Fund  Facility.  Reschedulings  include  Paris  Club,  commercial  banks,  and
aid-consortia  renegotiations.  This  information  was  compiled  from  our  own
country-by-country  investigations,  and  from  published  and  unpublished  IMF
sources.  The  date  of  rescheduling  was  selected  to  reflect  the  key  economic
developments  precipitating  the  rescheduling.
SARE
Level  of  "Significant"  Arrears  in  Interest,  1970-1986,  WB. "Significant"
defined  as  greater  than  .001  of  Total  External  Debt.
SAlP
Level  of  "Significant"  Arrears  in  Principal,  1970-1986,  YB.  "Significant"
defined  as  greater  than  .01  of  Total  External  Debt.
SAP
"Significant"  Total  Arrears  in  Principal  and  Interest,  1970-1986,  UB. See
above.-25  -
CRISIS3H
"Severity  of Crisis"  Indicator:  O=no  repayments  probl  i,  1=significant
arrears  only,  2=IMF  or  RSS,  1971-1987.
PirIF
Binary  Indicator,  O=no  repayments  problem,  l=significant  arrears,  IMF
involvement,  or  rescheduling  agreement,  1971-1987.
SARF
"Significant"  Total  Arrears  in  Principal  and  Interest,  1971-1987,  VB. See
above.
CUEPSABI
Cumulated  number  of  past  years  with  significant  arrears  in  interest  present.
CIJPSARP
Cumulated  number  of past  years  with  significant  arrears  in principal
present.
CJJROXI




Secondary  Market Discounted  Price.  Percentage  of its  nominal  value  at  which  a
claim on a country's  external  debt obligations  trades on the secondary markets.
Years  1986  and  1987  available.
Source:  Salomon  Brothers  Inc.,  New  York
INPEIST
Cumulated  number  of  years  since  1970  with  IMF  involvement.
RSSIIST
Cumulated  count  of  reschedulings  since  1970.
PCGDP80
Per  Capita  CDP,  1980  US$,  1970-1986,  YB.
DBTTOEXP
Total  External  Debt  Relative  to  Exports,  1970-1986,  VDT,  IFS. Total  debt
includes  public  and  private  debt  outstanding  and  disbursed,  short-term
debt,  and  use  of  IMF  credit.
KESTOIIP
International  Reserves  (Excl.  Gold)  Relative  to  Imports,  1970-1986,  WDT.
DSDTOEXP
Total  Debt  Service  Due  Relative  to Exports,  1970-1986,  VDT,  VB.  Debt
service  due  defined  as  intorest  and  principal  paid  (TDS  from  VDT)  plus
outstanding  interest  and  principal  arrears.- 26 -
ISDTOEIP
Interest  Service  Due  Relative  to  Exports,  1970-1986,  UDT,  UB. Interest
service  due defined  as interest  paid (INT  from UDT)  plus  outstanding
interest  arrears.
PSDTOEXP
Principal  Service  Due  Relative  to  Exports,  1970-1986,  VDT,  YB.  Principal
service  due  defined  as  principal  paid  plus  outstanding  principal  arrears.
DSPTOEIP
Total  Debt  Service  Paid  Relative  to  Exports,  1970-1986,  UDT.
ISPTOEXP
Total  Interest  Service  Paid  Relative  to  Exports,  1970-1986,  VDT.
PSPTOEXP
Total  Principal  Service  Paid  Relative  to  Exports,  1970-1986,  VDT.
IIPTOGNP
Imports  Relative  to  GNP,  1970-1986,  VDT.
EXPTOGNP
Exports  Relative  to  GNP,  1970-1986,  YDT.
CATOGWP
Current  Account  Balance  (Exports  - Imports)  Relative  to  GNP,  1970-1986,
VDT.
LIBOR3I0
London  Interbank  Offer  Rate  for  3  month  loans,  1970-1986,  IFS.
LIBOR61O
London  Interbank  Offer  Rate  for  6  months,  1970-1986,  IFS.
OPECRES
OPEC  International  Reserves  (in  SDR's),  1970-1986,  IFS.
OPECCA
OPEC  Current  Account  (Exports  - Imports),  US$  billions,  1970-1986,  IFS.
INDCINFL
Average  CPI  Inflation  in  Industrial  Countries,  1970-1986,  IFS.
INDCCA
Current  Account  (Exports  - Imports)  of  Industrial  Countries,  USS  billions,
1970-1986,  IFS.
OVERVAL
Black  Market  Exchange  Rate  from  VCY/IFS  Exchange  Rate  Period  Average,
1970-1986,  VCY,  IFS.  Both  in  units  of  national  currency  per  US  dollar.- 27  -
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Table  1
Patterns  of  Transitions  between  Repayments  Problems
Type  of  Problem  in  Year  t
Count  Row
(Column  %)  N  A  R  I  AR  Al  RI  AU  Total
Row  %N  821  44  9  61  0  2  13  2  952
(90.8)  23.0)  40.9) (7.S)  (0.0)  4.0  (21.3)  3  g  63.0
[86.2]  4.6]  0.9  t[6.4]  [0.0]  0.2]  [1.4  0.2]
A  15  119  0  1  5  4  4  10  158
(1.7)  (62.3)  (0.0)  (0.5) (5.5)  [8  0  f6  6]  19  6)  10.4
[945]  [75  .3  [L.0]  L0.61 t3-2]  [22.5 2-5  163
K  5  4  7  0  0  0  2  1  19
i0 6)  (2.1)  31.8)  (0.0)  (0.0)  (0.  ( 3.  (2.0)  1.3
r'26  3]  [21.1i t36.83  [0  0  [0  0  [0  0  lO5]  [5,3
Type  I  59  6  1  138  0  11  15  1  231
of  (  6.5)  (3.1)  (4.5) (62.2)  (0.0) (22.0) (24.6)  (2.02  15.3
Problem  [25.5]  [2.6]  [0.4] [59.7]  [0.0] [4.8]  [6.5]  [0.4]
in
Year  lR  2  4  0  0  4  0  0  0  10
,-1  [  0.2)  (  2.1)  to  0.0  0.)  36.41 [(0.0  [g00  t  [01  0.7
l20.0] [40.0  0.0  0.]  140.0  [0.0  [0.0]  tO.O
Al  0  8  2  3  0  17  3  7  40
[0.0)  (4.2  -9  [1.4  [(0.0  34.05  4.9'  13[  7)  2.6
[0.0]  20.0  [5  0  [7.5  [0.0  [42.5]  7  5  [17.5]
RI  2  3  3  18  1  9  21  7  64
(0.2)  (1.6)  (13.6  (  8.1)  (9.1)  (18.0j)  (34.4)  (13.7  4.2
[31  [4.7  4.7  28.  [:16  [14.1  [32  [13:70  94
All  0  3  0  1  1  7  3  23  38
f0:j  (1.6j  (0.0)  (0.5  ~9.  I  (14.0)  (4.9) (45.1)  2.5
[0.0  [  7.9  [9.g  2.6  2[6  [18.4.  9  (64.5.
Column  904  191  22  222  11  50  61  51  1512
Total  59.8  12.6  1.5  14.7  0.7  3.3  4.0  3.4  100.0
Notes:
1.  Column  Percentages  in  parentheses,  Row  Percentages  in  square  brackets
2.  1512  valid  country/year  observations
3.  N  = No  Repayments  Problem  AR  = A  and  R
A  = Significant  Arrears  AI  =  A  and  I
R  = Rescheduling  Occurrence  RI  = R  and  I
I  = IMF  Involvement  ARI  = A  and  R  and  I- 30  -
Table  2
Binary  Response  Estimation  Results
Explanatory  Probit  Probit  Model  Probit  Probit  Model
Variable  Model  with  Random  Effects  Model  with  Random  Effects
const  -1.16  -1.23  -0.84  -0.91
[-10.17]  [-11.27]  [-2.52]  [-2.02]
pcgdp80  -5.39e-4  -5.57e-4  -2.82e-2  -2.44e-2
[-1.  4Ne-2]  [-1.27e-2]  [-0.64]  [-0.52]
dbttoexp  1.46e-3  1.59e-3  2.16e-3  2.39e-3
[2.76]  [2.33]  [3.37]  [2.99]
restoimp  7.92e-2  -7.81e-2  -9.88e-2  -9.Ole-2
[-4.21]  [-3.88]  [-4.35]  [-4.01]
isdtoexp  6.94e-2  5.77e-2  6.14e-2  6.22e-2
[4.43]  [4.99]  [3.30]  [3.22]
psdtoexp  2.37e-2  -2.52e-2  -2.523-2  -2.07e-2
[-2.35]  [-2.59]  [-2.21]  [-2.44]
catognp  4.40e-2  4.56e-2  0.59  0.91
[0.11]  [0.29]  [1.21]  [1.27]
libor6mo  4,64e-3  4.0'e-3
[0.22]  [0.18]
opecres  -2.03e-3  -2.82e-3
[-0.49]  [-0.38]
opecca  9.54e-4  8.92e-4
[0.24]  [0.33]
indcinf1  -3.50e-2  -4.OOe-2
[-0.71]  [-0.67]
indcca  -2.60e-3  -2.83e-3
[-0.66]  [-0.57]
overval  -- 0.32  -0.29
[-1  26]  [-1.03]
psari  1.91  1.95  1.71  1.64
[7.02]  [7.59]  [6.10]  [6.07]
psarp  1.59  1.21  1.12  1.06
[5.34]  [5.27]  [2.74]  [2.49]
prssimf  1.45  1.01  1.36  1.17
[12.05]  [10  L1]  [10.04]  [9.33]
cumpsari  3.00e-2  2.77e-2  4.78e-2  3.98e-2
[0.62]  [0.53]  [0.96]  [0.56]
cumpsarp  6.12e-2  6.55e-2  -3.32e-3  -3.52e-3
r0.79]  [0.88]  [-4.09e-2]  [-4.99e-2]
cumrori  4.27e-2  4.01e-2  9.48e-3  8.92e-3
[1.73]  [1.12]  [0.31]  [0.21]
a*  0.32  0.29
loglikelihood  [3.26]  [3.02]
logl  ikel  ihood
at  convergence  -498.54  -497.61  -410.65  -409.22
constrained  -927.43  -927.43  -739.59  -739.59
Pseudo  R 2 0.463  0.469  0.442  0.447
number  of  obs  1338  1338  1067  1067
%  correctly  pred  84.60  84.60  83.97  83.97
Notes:  1.  Dependent  variable:  PARIF
2.  a = stand  dev  of  random  effect-31  -
Table  3
Explanatory  OrderedProbit  OrderedProbit  Tobitlodel  Tobitlodel
Variable  Nodel  REModel  withRE
const  -0.91  -0.81  -2.40e-2  -2.53e-2
[-8.93]  [-8.44]  [-11.99]  [-8.08]
pcgdp8O  -1.28e-2  -1.38e-2  8.01e-4  9.70e-4
[-0.38]  [-0.35]  [1.64]  [1.69]
dbttoexp  8.87e-4  8.36e-4  6.65e-6  8.53e-6
[2.14]  [2.88]  [1.56]  [1.73]
restoimp  -7.72e-2  -7.42e-2  -3.35e-4  -2.99e-4
[-4.63]  [-4.01]  [-1.64]  [-1.35]
isdtoexp  4.65e-2  4.48e-2  2.05e-4  2.53e-4
[2.82]  [2.27]  '  [1.56]  [1.61]
psdtoexp  -B.63e-3  -6.28e-3  -2.90e-5  -1.80e-5
[-0.70]  [-0.33]  [-0.26]  [-0.16]
catognp  0.12  0.22  -1.46e-2  -1.39e-2
[0.36]  [0.18]  [-2.86]  [-2.03]
psari  0.83  0.93  1.04e-2  8.98e-3
[5  90]  [5.37]  [5.41]  [5.12]
psarp  0.36  0.26  8.82e-3  8.24e-3
[2.56]  [2.06]  [4.02]  [3.83]
prssimf  1.55  1.59  1.76e-3  1.24e-3
[14.22]  [14.16]  [1.25]  [0.81]
cumpsari  -3.00e-2  -3.50e-2  1.06e-3  9.33e-4
[-1.14]  [-1.02]  [3.25]  [2.89]
cumpsarp  9.13e-2  9.63e-2  -9.57e-4  -1.27e-3
[1.84]  [1.72]  [-1.54]  [-2.03]
cumrori  2.16e-2  2.08e-2  9.93e-4  1.31e-3
[1.08]  [0.73]  [3.81]  [4.16]
sari  1.68  1.82
[3.14]  [3.13]
sarp  0.84  0.80
[8.80]  [8.32]
01.  0.51  0.57
[10.41]  [9.28]
U1  1.26e-2  1.20e-2
[93.00]  [14.96]
LT  0.43  3.96e-3
[3.68]  [4.37]
loglikelihood:
at  convergence -863.97  -861.04  554.880  556.399
constrained  -1273.13  -1273.13  227.560  227.560
Pseudo  RI 2 0.321  0.326  0.732  0.746
number  of  obs.  1338  1338  1338  1338
%  correctly  pred.  76.31  76.31
Notes:
1.  01  = threshold  level  between  regimes  1  and  2  in  ordered  probit  model  (00  = 0)
o,, = stand.  dev.  of  i.i.d.  error,  a=  stand.  dev.  of  random  effect  error
2.  Dependent  variable  for  ordered  probit  models  is  CRISIS3F  and  SARF  for  tobit.- 32  -
Table  4
Structural  Stability  of  Creditworthiness  Models
Nodel  Probit  Ordered  Probit  Tobit
A. Complete  Sample
log  likelihood  -497.61  -861.04  556.40
B.  Tests  for  1973  Break
Dummy  variable  test:
postl973  0.20  0.28  0.13
t-statistic 1.63  1.59  1.13
LR  test:
postl973  - 1066  obs
loglik  -400.20  -706.81  451.24
%7correct  84.43  75.33  77.43
pre1973  - 272  obs
loglik  -83.66  -135.38  115.64
%  correct  87.87  76.73  78.26
value  of  LR  statistic  27.52*  19.70  20.96
C.  Tests  for  1981  Break
Dummy  variable  test:
postl981  0.23  0.11  0.24
t-statistic 1.97**  1.07  1.82*
Lt  test:
postl981  - 420  obs
log  lik  -134.55  -251.76  177.21
%  correct  86.67  70.24  72.54
prel981  - 918  obs
loglik  -341.65  -597.26  389.98
%  correct  85.29  76.24  77.24
value  of  LR  statistic  42.82**  24.04  21.58
Notes:
*  = Significant  at  5%  level
**  = Significant  at  1%  level
Significance  levels  of  the  x2 distribution:
d.f.  14  15  17
at  5%  level  23.69  25.00  27.59
at  1%  level  29.14  30.56  33.41-33  -
Table  5
Prediction  Ability  of  Creditworthiness  Models
Correlations
A:  All  available  data  (1338  observations)
predp  predop predt  parif  sarf  crisis3f
predp  1.
predop  0.95  1.
predt  0.63  0.72  1.
parif  0.73  0.69  0.52  1.
sarf  0.28  0.27  0.73  0.26  1.
crisis3f 0.69  0.71  0.61  0.95  0.20  1.
B:  Year  1985  (28  observations)
predp  predop predt  parif  sarf  crisis3f
predp  1.
predop  0.85  1.
predt  0.42  0.52  1.
parif  0.30  0.21  0.52  1.
sarf  0.21  0.25  0.80  0.16  1.
crisis3f 0.12  0.23  0.66  0.75  0.10  1.
C:  Year  1986  (24  observatigns)
predp  predop predt  parif  sarf  crisis3f
predp  1.
predop  0.87  1.
predt  0.33  0.43  1.
parif  0.96  0.83  0.41  1.
sarf  0.22  0.23  0.39  0.18  1.
crisis3f 0.81  0.94  0.27  0.83  0.17  1.
Notes:
Actual  Data:
parif  = presence  of  a  repayments  problem
sarf  = level  of  significant  arrears
crisis3f  = classifying  dummy  variable:  "no  problem,  "mild  crisis,"
and  "severe  crisis"  regimes
Predicted  probabilities  of  a  repayments  Droblem:
predp  =  prediction  from  the  probit  model
predop  = prediction  from  the  -dered  probit  model
predt  = prediction  from  the  tobit  model-34  -
Table  6
ExDlaining  the  Secondary  Market  Discounted  Prices  Using  Indicators  of  Creditworthiness
Legend
secdprc = secondary  market  discounted  price
credp  = probit  model  creditworthiness  indicator
credop = ordered  probit  model  creditworthiness  indicator
credt  = tobit  model  creditworthiness  indicator
= Data  not  available
Part  A:  Actual  Series
Year  1985  I  Year  1986
Country
secdpr  credp  credop  credt  Isecdpr  credp  credop  credt
Algeria  *  *  *  *  94.0  89.25 78.40 44.02
Argentina  64.0  0.00  0.10 24.69  47.0  0.00  0.01 31.90
Bolivia  5.0  0.01 15.73 4.94  9.0  0  319
Brazil  75.0  0.01  1.94 18.88  61.0  0.68  2.29 43.85
Chile  66.0  1.60  4.82 66.14  69.0  0.84  3.31 55.73
Colombia  64.0  7.11  8.49 15.05  84.5  13.10  54.92  69.32
CostaRica  53.0  1.08  3.13 60.66  36.0  0.05  2.44 51.05
Dom.Rep.  45.0  0.06  2.67 25.28  45.0  0.00  0.65 81.43
Ecuador  65.5  1.98  4.33 95.37  49.0  0.95  2.80 14.18
Gabon  *  *  *  *  82.0  *  *  *
Guatemala  52.0  10.29  46.89  45.08  72.0  7.21 43.32  36.56
Honduras  40.0  3.10 31.20  12.92  38.0  0.02 15.95  18.45
Ivory  Coast  74.0  2.92  4.60 39.47  62.0  0.02  1.64 12.03
Jamaica  45.0  4.90  6.04 14.85  37.0  0.04  2.05  8.08
Libya  13.0  0.00  1.06  0.24  5.0  0.06 22.10  24.35
Madagascar  64.0  0.00  0.35 64.68  55.0  *  *  *
Malawi  74.0  11.05  9.46 54.80  74.0  *  *  *
Nexico  60.0  0.97  2.59 88.92  56.0  0.55  2.06 35.74
Morocco  70.0  *  *  *  65.5  *  *  *
Nicaragua  4.0  *  *  *  5.0  *  *  *
Nigeria  55.0  80.23  72.57  50.78  29.0  22.96  16.36  59.75
Panama  69.0  20.58 16.82 13.51  66.0  *  *  *
Peru  20.0  0.00  2.33 70.01  11.0  0.07 27.46  49.93
Philippines  59.0  6.83  8.36 36.98  69.0  9.76 11.22  95.70
Poland  43.0  *  *  *  44.5  0.06  2.31 93.38
Romania  88.0  *  *  *  88.0  *
Senegal  70.0  12.44 11.66 40.83  64.0  *  *  *
Sudan  10.0  0.00  0.04 79.12  2.0  *  *  *
Togo  68.0  26.99  23.83  65.76  68.0  1.20 10.67  18.90
Turkey  97.5  14.71  11.53  97.35  97.0  59.49  60.95  28.21
Uruguay  63.0  6.54 11.01  73.26  73.5  0.48 11.65  67.98
Venezuela  76.0  40.93  39.11  85.49  70.0  72.26  78.00  69.81
Yugoslavia  79.0  20.24  17.56  45.09  75.0  0.60  8.02 86.10
Zaire  20.0  *  *  *  24.5  *  *  *
Zambia  18.0  0.00  0.60 54.86  18.0  0.00  0.93 68.47-35  -
Part  8:  Correlations  between Discounted Prices and Creditworthiness  Indicators
Year  1985
Correlations  (28  observations)
secdprc credp  credop  credt  parif crisis3f sarf
secdprc  1.
credp  0.29  1.
credop  0.13  0.85  1.
credt  0.60  0.42  0.52  1.
parif  -0.39  -0.30  -0.21  -0.52  1.
crisis3f  0.01  -0.12  -0.23  -0.66  0.75  1.
sarf  -0.55  -0.21  -0.25  -0.80  0.16  0.10  1.
Year  1986
Correlations  (24  observations)
secdprc credp  credop  credt  parif crisis3f sarf
secdprc  1.
credp  0.52  1.
credop  0.49  0.87  '.
credt  0.42  0.33  J.43  1.
parif  -0.51  -0.96  -0.83  -0.41  1.
crisis3f  -0.32  -0.81  -0.94  0.27  0.83  1.
sarf  -0.48  -0.22  -0.23  0.39  0.18  0.17  1.- 36  -
art c: Discounted  Prices  Explined  by  Regressions  with  Creditworthiness  Indicators
Current  and  Future
secdprcC5  52.62  + 0.48  * credp86  + 0.11I  *  credp85
[11.03]  [2.55]  [0.06]
Nobs=22  R2=0.21  DV=1.99
secdprc85  =  52.73  + 0.20  * credop86  + 0.47  * credop85
[9.65]  [2.01]  [0.24]
Nobs=22  02=0.16  DV=1.94
secdprc85  =  53.26  - 0.29  *credt86  +  0.17  *  credt85
[5.65]  [-1.74]  [1.18]
Nobs=22  i2=0.19  DV=1.91
Current  and  Past
secdprc86 =  49.97  + 0.64  * credp86  - 0.20  * credp85
[9.72]  [3.03]  [-0.82]
Nobs=23  R2=0.28  DV=2.06
secdprc8G =  45.50  +  0.48  * credop86  - 0.0002  * credop85
[8.31]  [2.23]  [-0.0009]
Nobs=23  R2=0.24  DV=1.92
secdprc86 =  44.94  + 0.33  * credt86  + 0.19  * credt85
[4.89]  [2.58]  [1.17]
Nobs=23  R2=0.26  DV=1.77
Notes:
1.  Last  two  digits  of  a  variable  name  signify  the  year
2.  Nobs  = number  of  countries  in  regressions37
Figure  1
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Averaged  over  93 countries  reportinlg  in  all  17 years38
Figure  2




70  73  76  79  82  85  88
Yeacr
Unweighted; 93 countries  reporting






o  70  73  76  79  82  85  88
Ye*r
Weigh:ed  bv Total  Outstanding  Debt;  93 countries  reporzingFigure  3










0  A~~~~~~~~~A 
CI)  A
A  -~~~~~
70  73  76  79  82  85  88
Year40
Figure  4
Sec.  Mrkt  Disc.  Prices  86-87
0g .'..............................  -..................................-----------------------  Legend
O........  3...  ------ *---1----.-----'  7  ..........  ..................  ..........  .............  OPrc87
O  . P.  .......--
t°  3-,  .........  .... .... ... . . . ...................  .. ..
0  . . 3  3  ..  .5  ......
(D  _..  . . . . . . ., . . 4.  . . - - - ------------..  . . .
..........  ........  .. *tIF  .* .3.....  ...... ,---*3*  .......
.........  ..... - . _  3~.......
U1)  to  ...3.  c...  33...........
a.  . .. . ... .. .. n.  . .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . .........
~~~~~~~~~~~.  . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .
cn ....  .. ,  ....  ...  _.  .t;
. bX  -*  - ............................
o  1  5  10  15  20  25  30  35
Country
Obserracos=  Counc:"  bse:qc'  acon  CQ=Zun
2  BOUiVta  20  Madagascar
3  Suda  2'.  Ecuador
4.  Libor-  22  Chila
S  Zambia  23  .Toso
6  Zai--  26  Panama
7  Peru  ,25  Senegal
a  Handaas  26  Morocco
9  Poland  27  Hawi
10  Dominican  Raoublic  28  Coca  d'Xvoiza
11  Jasca  29  Brazil1
12  Cuacwaiaa  30  Venezuela
13  Costa  R-ca  31  Yugoslavia
14.  Nigeri a  32  Gabon
S5  PbLil_lzines  33  RoamnLa
15  MSexico  34.  Alperia
17  Uruguayv  35  Turkey
is  Colo9iPPR  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Iva  Author  fDfp
WPS228 Economic  Performance  of  Robert  Lynn
Developing  Countries  in the 1980s  F. Desmond  McCarthy
WPS229 The EffOct  of Demographic  Changes  on Saving
for Life-Cycle  Motives  in Developing
Countries  Steven B. Webb  July 1989  E. Khine
Heidi  Zia  61765
WPS230 Unemployment,  Migration  and Wages
in Turkey,  1962-1985  Bent  Hansen  July 198S  C. Bermudez
39248
WPS231 The  World Bank  Revised  Minimum
Standard  Model  Doug Addison  May 1989  J. Onwuemene-
Kocha
61750
WPS232 Women  and Food Security  in Kenya Nadine  R. Horenstein  June 1989  M. Villar
33752
WPS233  Public  Enterprise  Reform  in Adjustment
Lending  John Nellis  August  1989  R. Malcolm
61708
WPS234 A Consistency  Framework
Macroeconomic Analysis  William  Easterly  June  1989  R.  Luz
61760
WPS235 Borrowing,  Resource  Transfers
and External  Shocks  to Developing
Countries: Historical  and
Counterfactual  Steven Webb  July 1989  E. Khine
Heidi  Zia  61765
WPS236  Education  and  Earnings  in Peru's
Informal  Nonfarm  Family  Enterprises Peter Moock  July 1989  M. Fisher
Philip Musgrove  34819
Morton Stelcner
WPS237 The Curricular  Content  of Primary
Education  in Developing  Countries  Aaron Benavot  June  1989  C. Cristobal
David  Kamens  33640
WPS238 The Distributional  Consequences  of a
Tax Reform  on a VAT  for Pakistan  Ehtisham  Ahmad
Stephen  Ludlow
WPS239 The Choice  Between  Unilateral  and Multi-
lateral  Trade Liberalization  Strategies  Julio Nogues  July 1989  S. Torrijos
33709PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
1:g2  AtAho  fr  apaper
WPS240 The Public  Role  in Private
Post-SecondaryEducation:
A Review  of Issues  and Options  Ake Blomqvist
Emmanuel  Jimenez  August  1989  A. Bhalla
61059
WPS241 The Effect  of Job Training  on  Ana-Maria  Arriagada  July 1989  C. Cristobal
Peruvian  Women's  Employment  and  33640
Wages
WPS242 A Multi-Level  Model  of Schott-  Effectiveness
in a Developing  Country  Marlaine  Lockheed
Nicholas  Longford
WPS243 Averting  Financial  Crisis  - Kuwait  Fawzi  Hamad  Al-Sultan
WPS244  Do Caribbean  Exporters  Pay  Higher
Freight Costs?  Alexander  Yeats  July 1989  J. Epps
33710
WPS245  Developing  a Partnership  of Indigenous
Peoples,  Conservationists,  and  Land  Use
Planners  in Latin  America  Peter  Poole  August 1989  S. Davis
38622
WPS246  Causes  of Adult Deaths  in Developing
Countries:  A Review  of Data and  Richard  Hayes  July 1989  S. Ainsworth
Methods  Thierry Mertens  31091
Geraldine  Lockett
Laura  Rodrigues
WPS247 Macroeconomic  Policies  for Structural
Adjustment  Carlos  A. Rodriguez
WPS248 Private Investment,  Government  Policy  and
Foreign  Capital  in Zimbabwe  Mansoor  Dailami  August  1989  M. Raggambi
Michael  Walton  61696
WPS249  The Determinants  of Hospial Costs:
An  Analysis  of Ethiopia  Ricardo  Bitran-Dicowsky
David  W. Dunlop
WPS250  The  Baker  Plan: Progress,  William  R. Cline  August  1989  S. King-Watson
Shortcomings,  and Future  Evolution  33730
WPS251  Patents,  Appropriate  Technology,  Ishac  Diwan
and North-South  Trrade  Dani  Rodrik
WPS252  Do the Secondary  Markets  Believe  Vassilis  A. Hajivassiliou  August 1989  S. King-Watson
in  Life After Debt  33730